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Cotter, Jr. v. Dist. Ct., 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 32 (May 3, 2018) (en banc)1 
 
WORK-PRODUCT PRIVILEGE: ADOPTING THE COMMON INTEREST RULE 
 
Summary 
 
The Court adopted the common interest rule as an exception to waiver of the work-product 
privilege. The common interest rule requires that the “transferor and transferee [must] anticipate 
litigation against a common adversary on the same issue or issues” and to “have strong common 
interests in sharing the fruit of the preparation efforts.”2  
 
Background 
 
Petitioner James Cotter served as the CEO and Chairman of the Board of Directors of 
Reading International, Inc. (Reading) from approximately 2000 to 2014 and upon termination filed 
a complaint alleging breach of fiduciary duty against Margaret Cotter, Ellen Cotter, Guy Adams, 
Edward Kane, Douglas McEachern, William Gould, Judy Codding, and Michael Wrotniak (real 
parties in interest) who are all members of the Board of Directors for Reading. Like Mr. Cotter, 
there were some Reading shareholders (intervening plaintiffs) who filed a derivative action, now 
consolidated with Mr. Cotter’s action, asserting breach of fiduciary duty against real parties in 
interest. 
 The district court, during discovery and after a motion from real parties in interest to 
compel petitioner to produce a supplemental privilege log, ordered petitioner to revise his privilege 
log and held off a ruling on the production of any communication between Lewis Roca Rothgerber 
LLP, counsel for petitioner, and Robertson & Associates, counsel for intervening plaintiffs. 350 
communications were produced, and a supplemental privilege log labeled approximately 150 
emails between the attorneys for petitioner and the intervening plaintiffs as work-product because 
they contained mental impressions of matters related to the case. 
 The real parties in interest argued the when the petitioner shared communication with the 
intervening plaintiffs it effectively waived the work-product privilege because the communication 
was disclosed to a third-party. Real parties in interest filed a motion to compel production of the 
emails and after oral arguments, which did not include an in camera review of the emails. The 
district court determined petitioner failed to show common interest between himself and the 
intervening plaintiffs, thus petitioner was ordered to produce the emails. This petition for writ 
followed.  
 
Discussion 
 
 The court exercised their jurisdiction for writ relief because without it, it would compel 
disclosure of the petitioner’s privileged communication and “petitioner would have no effective 
remedy, even by subsequent appeal.” The court reviews legal questions de novo and gives 
deference to the district court’s findings of fact.3 
                                                        
1  By Paloma M. Guerrero. 
2  United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980).  
3  Williams v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev. 518, 525, 262 P.3d 360, 365 (2011). 
 Real parties in interest argued petitioners waived the work-product privilege when they 
shared the communications with the intervening plaintiffs. Petitioner argued work-product 
privilege applied and that no waiver of the privilege occurred because he shares common interest 
in litigation with the intervening plaintiffs. Additionally, real parties in interest argued no common 
interest existed between petitioner and the intervening plaintiffs.  
 The work-product privilege “protects an attorney’s mental impressions, conclusions, or 
legal theories concerning the litigation, as reflected in memoranda, correspondence, interviews, 
briefs, or in other tangible and intangible ways."4 It exists to safeguard the attorney’s preparations 
for trial from being disclosed during discovery.  
 Similar to many jurisdictions, the Court adopted the common interest rule as an exception 
to waiver of the work-product privilege for disclosing communications to third parties. This allows 
attorneys to share their work product with each other, when they have the same interests, without 
waiving the work-product privilege. Application of the common interest rule requires that the 
“transferor and transferee [must] anticipate litigation against a common adversary on the same 
issue or issues” and “have strong common interests in sharing the fruit of the trial preparation 
efforts.”5 
 Common interest “may be implied from conduct and situation, such as attorneys 
exchanging confidential communications from clients who are or potentially may be codefendants 
or have common interest in litigation.” 6  Waiver of the privilege still applies when “it has 
substantially increased the opportunities for potential adversaries to obtain the information.”7 
 Here, the record demonstrates that petitioner and the intervening plaintiffs were all 
shareholders of Reading and asserted similar claims against real parties in interest. Intervening 
plaintiffs never filed a claim against petitioner; further, it is also unlikely they would disclose 
work-product material to the real parties in interest. Thus, the Court concluded petitioner and 
intervening plaintiffs anticipated litigation against a common adversary on similar issues—
breaches of fiduciary duty— and both parties shared a “sufficiently strong common interest in 
litigation.”  
 
Conclusion 
  
The Court granted petitioner’s writ of prohibition and instructed the district court to refrain 
from compelling disclosure of the emails until it reviews the emails in camera to evaluate whether 
they contain impressions, conclusions, opinions, and legal theories of counsel, pursuant to the 
work-product privilege. 
                                                        
4  Wardleigh, 111 Nev. at 357, 891 P.2d at 1188; see also NRCP 26(b)(3). 
5  Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d. at 1299.   
6  United States v. Gonzalez, 669 F.3d 974, 979 (9th Cir. 2012); 
7  Wynn Resorts, 133 Nev., Adv. Op. 52, 399 P.3d at 349 (internal quotation and citation omitted).    
